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Estate of CHARLES CHRISTIAN NEILSON, Deceased. 
HAZEL DEBOER et aI., Claimants and Appellants, v. 
Ii\'ES B. NEILSON, Claimant and Respondent. 
[1] Husband and Wife--Community and Separate Property.-
Profits of Business.-When a husband owns a business as hi'! 
separate property and devotes his efforts to the enterprise, 
there must be an apportionment of the profits between his 
separate property and the community property. 
[2] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business. 
-The usual method of apportionment of the profits of the 
business of a husband which he owns and in which he works 
is to allocate a fair return on the investment to the separate 
property and to allocate any excess to the community property 
as arising from his efforts; only when the profits and accruals 
actually attributable to the separate property are proved to 
differ from the usual interest rate for a well-secured invest-
ment is there reason to depart from this system. 
[3] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business. 
- An apportionment of the profits of the business of a hus-
band which he owns as his separate property is required not 
only when he conducts a commercial enterprise, but also when 
he in,ests separate funds in real estate or securities. The 
proceeds and increment in value are apportioned entirely to the 
husband's separate estate only when they are attributable 
solely to the natural enhancement of the property, or when the 
husband expended only minimal effort and the wife introduced 
no evidence attributing a value to his services. 
[4] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business. 
-A grain f armer or nursery operator who conducts his enter-
prise on separate real property should not be exempted from 
the normal apportionment rule, but should be required to ac-
count to the community for a portion of the profits. Although 
it Illay be difficult to make an npportionment, it is "impossible" 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 21, 22; Am.Jur., 
Community Property, § 32. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Husbnnd and Wife, § 58; [5, 6] 
Husbnnd and Wife, § 93; [7] Husband and Wife, § 132; [8] Hus-
band and Wife, § 59; [9, 10] Husband and Wife, §§ 58, 59; [11, 
13-16] Husb~nd and Wife, § 159; [12] Husband and Wife, § 45; 
[17] E,idence. ~ :20;;: [18,19] Decedents' Estates, § 988; [20] De-
cedents' Estates, § 1121; [21, :26] Decedents' Estates, § 993; [22] 
Decedents' Estatps, ~ 982; [23] Decec1ents' Estates, ~ 981; [24] 
Decedents' Estates, § 980; [2;) J Decedcnts' Estates, §§ 981, 989. 
) 
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only in the sense that it cannot be mathematically certain. 
(Oven-uling E st(;/ e of Pepper, 1;38 Cal. 619 [112 P. 62, 31 
L.R.A. N.S. 1092].) 
[5] ld.-Community and Separate Property-lnstructions.-It was 
proper to refuse an instruction which erroneously declared 
that even though a husband devoted his efforts to farming 
operations on his separate property, all of the income and 
earnings thercfrom would be his separate property. 
[6a., 6b] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Instructions.-
An instruction that "Evidence that there was no excess of com-
munity incollle over community expenses is as effective to 
prove that all asse ts in the name of a decedent are separate 
property as a specific showing from which separate source 
each asset flowed" lI"as erroneously incomplete where trans-
mutation of separate property into community property by 
agreement was in issue. 
[7] Id.-Presumption of Payment of Debts Out of Community 
Property.-It is presumed that the expenses of the family are 
paid from community r:l.ther than separate funds; in the ab-
sence of any evidence showing :l. different practice, the com-
munity earnings are eh:l.rgeable with these expenses. 
[8] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Profits of Business. 
-When a husband devotes his services to and invests hi":; 
separate property in an economic enterprise, the part of the 
profits or increment in value attributable to the husband' :; 
services must be apportioned to the community. 
[9] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Relation of Income 
to Living Expenses.-If the amount of profits from a husband's 
separate property apportioned to the cOlUlUunity is less than 
the amount expcnded for family purposes, and if the pre-
sm,lption that family expenses are paid from cOlllmunity funds 
applies, all asse ts traceable to the investment are deemed to 
be th(> husk,nd's separatc property. 
[10] ld.-Community and Separate Property-Relation of Income 
to Living Expenses.-"\Yhen a husband purchases property 
durir.g the marriage with funds of an undisclosed or disputed 
S0urce, the presumption that the property is cOll1lllunity may 
be oyercome by evidence th at cOlllmunity expenses exceeded 
the community income. 
[11] Id.-Transacti:ms Inter Se-Changing Character of Property. 
-It is not es~ential for the wi Pe or any lI"itness to show an 
expre5S agreemen t changing the character of the husband's 
separate ~"opcrty to C0111lll1mity property; a change in the 
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 35. 
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Community Property, §§ 18, 46, 56, 58; 
Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, §§ 281, 302. 
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s tatus of the property may he ~h owll by the nature of the 
tr:mS:lcti oll (.;. appC:11' f ..alll the surroundin g circull1 stnncps. 
[12] Id.-Community and Separate Property-Inchoate Title Be-
fore Maniage C0mp~eted Afterwards.-Where p:!)"ments 011 
renl property purchased by one spouse before mnrrin ge were 
mnde both before and after the marriage, the community has a 
pro tanto interest in th e pr operty in the mtio th at pnyments 
on the purchase price with community funds hear to pnyments 
made with separate funds. In such a case the property cannot 
be considered entirely community by virtue of commingling 
of separate and community assets, since the separate and com-
munity sources of the property can be traced. 
[13] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Changing Character of Property. 
-The fact that a husband and wife filed tax returns splitting 
their income before 1948 is substantial evidence that will sup-
port a finding of an agreement to translllute separate to c )m-
munity property. The filing of such r eturns, however, does 
not estahlish transmutation as a matter of law. 
L14] Id.-Tr:'.Ilsaetions Inter Se-Changing Character of Property. 
-Since it is presumed that a person obeys the law (Code Civ. 
Proc., § ID63, subd. 33), alld since a husband and wife could 
split their income for tax purposes prior to 1948 only if it 
was community income or each owned half the property, the 
filing of tax returns splitting their income prior to that year, 
having been signed under the penalty of perjury, created a 
disputable presumption that the husband had filed lawful in-
cnme returns and that his separate l;lroperty had heen t"C"8IlS-
llluted into community property. 
[15] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Changing Character of Property. 
-The presumption of trnnslllutntion of separate property into 
communi ty, established by the filing of tax returns splitting 
the total income of both spouses prior to 1948, can be over-
come by evidence that the income splitting represented noth-
ing more than an overzealous desire to minimize income taxes, 
such as evidence that the returns were prepared by or on the 
ndvice of a tax expert and the spou;;es did not understand 
the significance of reporting income in this manner, or testi-
mony or documents indicating that the spouses regarded the 
property as separate property despite the filing of income-
splitting returns. 
[16] Id.-Transactions Inter Se-Changing Character of Property. 
-The mere fact that a wife joined with her husband in the 
execution of deeds and notes would not support a finding 
of transmutation of the husband's separate property into 
community property, especially where there was testimony of 
a bank offic'er that he had the wife sign the notes because he 
noticed that the hushand's hC:1lth was failing and testimony 
. of n title insurance company 's officer that it was the policy of 
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the company to require a wife to join in the execution of 
a deed even when title to the property is vested in the hus-
band. The jury could, however, consider such documents as 
evidence supporting the presumption that, by filing incomt'-
splitting tax returns prior to 1948, the husband had converted 
his separate property into community property. 
[17] Evidence - Admissions - Of Persons Other Than· party.-
When a person makes a statement in the presence of a party 
to an action under circumstances that would normally call 
for a response if the statement were untrue, the statement 
is admissible for the limited purpose of showing the party'" 
reaction to it. His silence, evasion or equivocation may be con-
sidered as a tacit admission of the statements made in his 
presence. 
[18] Decedents' Estates-Heirship Proceedings-Evidence.-In a 
proceeding by children of decedent to determine heirship tl) 
property, any admissions the decedent may have made with 
regard to the property would be binding on the children as his 
successors in interest. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 4.) 
[19] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Evidence.-In a proceeding by 
children of decedent to determine heirship to property, de-
cedent's silence at the time of an alleged remark made pri-
vately to decedent and the children's stepmother by a bank 
officer who had no particular familiarity with the cbaracter 
of the property, and which was at most a vague and incon-
clusive assertion, that some unidentified items were com-
munity property could not be interpreted as an adoptive 
admission so as to make the bank officer's statement admis-
sible in evidence. 
[20] ld.-Rules of Practice.-Not all rules of practice providl'd 
by part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable 
to probate proceedings by Prob. Code, § 1233; such proceed-
ings are to conform only as nearly as is consistently possible 
to those for civil actions. 
[21] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Interest.-The fact that Prob. 
Code, § 1232, authorizes an award of costs in heirship pro-
ceedings, but neither that nor any other section of the code 
authorizes an interest award in such proceedings, indicates 
that interest is not to be awarded. 
[22] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Nature.-An heirship pro('.eeding 
is not an ordinary civil action, but a specialized proceeding 
in rem. 
[23] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Purpose.-The sole purpose of an 
heirship proceeding is to determine who are the heirs of de-
cedent or entitled to distribution of the estate and to specify 
their interests. 
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[24] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Decree.-A decree of heirship in 
an heirship proceeding is not in favor of one of the parties 
against another. 
[25] ld. - Heirship Proceedings - Purpose: Decree.-Prob. CodE', 
§§ 1080-1082, relating to heirship proceedings, provide a special 
proceeding for the purpose of ascertaining and determining, 
in advance of distribution, the persons who have succeeded to 
the estate and the portions inherited by or devised to each of 
them. No other judgment is to be rendered and no disposition 
is to be made of the estate; it is a determination, first, of 
the persons entitled as heirs, devisees or legatees, or as their 
successors if any have died, and, second, the interest of each 
one in the estate of decedent. 
[26] ld.-Heirship Proceedings-Interest.-In an heirship proceed-
ing it was error to award the testator's disinherited widow 
interest on half the property found to be community property. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanis-
laus County determining heirship. H. L. Chamberlain, Judge. 
Reversed. 
Cleveland J. Stockton, William C. Coffill, Griffin, Conway 
& Jones and Jack R. Jones for Claimants and Appellants. 
Robert R. Elledge and Charles M. Samson for Claimant 
and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Charles and Ethel Neilson were married 
in 1907. A son, Edwin Neilson, and a daughter, Mrs. Hazel 
DeBoer, are the sole issue of the marriage. Upon Ethel's death 
on May 1, 1939, the assets acquired during the marriage 
became the separate property of Charles. 
On September 29, 1939, Charles mauied Ines Neilson. She 
owned no property at that time and acquired no separate 
property thereafter. Charles then owned three parcels of 
land, 24, 821 and 1,307 acres respectively, on which he raised 
grain. He paid for the 24-acre parcel before the marriage, 
but paid approximately $38,500 thereafter on the balance 
due for the other two parcels. During the marriage his income 
came almost exclusively from the sale of grain from these 
parcels and from numerous sales of unimproved realty. 
Charles' died testate on May 12, 1958. In his will he 
declared that "all of the property which I have is my own 
separate property and represents the accumulation of myself 
and my former wife, the mother of my two children." The 
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will disinherited Ines, devised ccrtain real property to Wade 
Coffill in trust for Edwin, and left the residue of the estate 
to Hazel. After the will was admitted to probate, Ines elected 
to take half the community property existing at the time of 
Charles' death (Prob. Code, § 201.) 
The executor initiated this heirship proceeding under Pro-
bate Code section 1080 to determine the rights of the various 
persons claiming an interest in the estate. The sole issue is 
how much, if any, of the decedent's estate was community 
property. 
By stipulation of the parties the court submitted to the 
jury a special interrogatory as to the character of each of 
the 65 items of real and personal property in the inventory 
of the estate. Ines agreed that 16 items of personal property 
were decedent 's separate property. The jury returned a spe-
cial verdict that these and six other items of personal prop-
(·rty were decedent's separate property and that the remainder 
of the personal property and all of the real property were 
community property, except the balance of the purchase price 
due on the 1951 sale of the 24-acre parcel, which was found 
to be half community property and half decedent's separate 
property. Among the items of personal property found to be 
community property IS the balance due on three sales of 
unimproved realty. 
The court entered a decree determining that Ines was 
entitled to half the property found to be community property, 
with interest thereon. Coffill, Edwin, and Hazel appeal. They 
contend that the trial court 's refusal to give two instructions 
was prejudicial error, that the decree is not supported by 
substantial evidence, and that interest cannot be allowed in 
an heirship proceeding. 
The first proposed instruction, based upon Estate of Pepper, 
158 Cal. 619 [112 P . 62, 31 L .R.A. N.S. 1092J , declared: 
"If the income and profits of separate property of a husband 
can be accurately identified and segregated, they would be his 
separate property and not commnnity property. Thus, the 
in:,ome and earnings from the farming operations of a hus-
hand conducted by him upon his separate real property con-
stitute his separate property, and are not community prop-
erty even though he has devoted his personal industry, skill 
and att~ntion to the cultivation and care of the farm prop-
crty." The trial court refused to give this instruction on the 
<:'round that the rule of Estate of Pepper has been "practically 
wrpcked" by snb~;e ql1l'nt cases. 
In the Pepper case the estate consisted entirely of proceeds 
-
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from the sale of deeedent's real property, which had been 
used for a nursery business, and the profits and earnings 
therefrom. Until he sold the land he devoted his time and 
energy to the nursery business. The court held that no appor-
tionment of the nursery profits was required. 
In reaching its decision that the entire estate was the 
decedent's separate property the court stated: "The appellant 
does not dispute the proposition that, if Pepper had, year 
after year, sown his land to grai7l, the resulting crops would 
have formed a part of his separate estate. But it is argued 
that, in the case of the nursery, the principal element in the 
success of the venture was the industry, skill, and attention 
of Pepper, and that the use of the land was merely incidental 
to what was, in effect, a commercial enterprise. We are unable 
to see that this argument furnishes a sufficient ground of 
distinction. In any agricultural enterprise, the labor and skill 
of man are essential to success. An orchard or a grain field 
must be cultivated and cared for. The resultant product is 
in part due to the processes of nature operating upon the 
land, and in part to the intelligent application of manual labor 
to the soil. It is, in the nature of things, impossible to appor-
tion the crop so as to determine what share of it has come 
from the soil and what share from the exertions of man. The 
product must be treated as a whole, and, if it is the growth 
of land separately owned, it is the separate property of the 
owner of the land .... If the crop of grain sown and har-
vested by the owner of the land constitutes' issues and profits' 
of the land, we are unable to see why the same may not be 
said of young trees and plants raised on the land until they 
are ready for transplanting." (158 Cal. at pp. 623-624.) 
(Italics added.) 
It is apparent from the language italicized that one of the 
grounds of the court's holding was the wife's concession that 
the proceeds of a grain crop grown upon the realty of a 
husband would be his separate property, regardless of his 
efforts in raising the crop. The relevant statutes make no 
distinction between agricultural and other enterprises (Civ. 
Code, §§ 162, 163), and there were no reported cases that 
would warrant such a concession or that would support the 
proposition that profits are apportioned between the hus-
band's separate property and the community property only 
when the enterprise is "commercial" rather than "agricul-
tural " 
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[1] In Pereira v. Pereim, 156 Cal. 1, 7 [103 P . 488, 134 
Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A. N.S. 880], decided one year before 
the Pepper case, this court first announced the rule that when 
a husband owns a business as his separate property and 
devotes his efforts to the enterprise, there must be an appor-
tionment of the profits. [2] The usual method of appor-
tionment is to allocate a fair return on the investment to the 
separate property and to allocate any excess to the community 
property as arising from the husband's efforts . (Pereira v. 
Pereira, supra; Estate of Arstein, 56 Ca1.2d 239, 241 [14 Cal. 
Rptr. 809, 364 P.2d 33] ; Randolph v. Randolph, 118 Cal.App. 
2d 584, 587 [258 P .2d 547] ; Stice v. Stice, 81 Cal.App.2d 792. 
796 [185 P.2d 402].) "Only when the profits and accruals 
actually attributable to the separate property are proved to 
differ from [the usual interest rate for a well-secured invest-
ment] ... is there reason to depart from this system. " 
(Randolph v. Randolph, s1Ipra.) Departures from the Pereira 
formula have been made when the husband introduced evi-
dence that "a larger return on his capital had in fact been 
realized." (Gilmore v. Gilmm'e, 45 Cal.2d 142, 150 [287 P.2d 
769] [great increase in automobile business as a whole accom-
panied by increase in value of husband's dealer franchises; 
husband did not take active part in conducting routine opera-
tions of the business] ; Harrold v. Harrold, 43 Ca1.2d 77, 80 
[271 P .2d 489] [same]; Huber v. Huber, 27 Cal.2d 784, 792 
[167 P .2d 708] [custom broker business required considerable 
capital since money was advanced for customers]; Tassi v. 
Tassi, 160 Cal.App.2d 680, 691 [325 P.2d 872] [high profits 
realized in meat business generally] ; Logan v. Fm'ster, 114 
Cal.App.2d 587, 601 [250 P.2d 730] [increase in population 
and economic development of community; wife played in-
active role in conducting her business] .) 
[3] An apportionment of profits is required not only 
when the husband conducts a commercial enterprise but also 
when he invests separate funds in real estate or securities. 
(JIargolis, v. Margolis, 115 Cal.App.2d 131, 135 [251 P .2d 
396]; W1:tasch ek v. Witaschck, 56 Cal.App.2d 277, 280-281 
[132 P.2d 600].) The proceeds and increment in "alue are 
apportioned entirely to the husband's separate estate only 
when they are attributable solely to the natural enhancement 
of the property (Estate of Cudworth , 133 Cal. 462, 468 [65 P. 
1041] ; McDu.ff v. McDuff, 48 Cal.App. 175, 177 [191 P. 957 ] ) 
or when the husband expended only minimal effort and the 
wife introduced no evidencc attributing a value to his services. 
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( Cozz i v. Cozzi, 81 Cal.App.2d 229, 232 [183 P.2d 739]; 
E stat c of Barnes, 128 Cal.App. 489, 492 [17 P.2d 1046].) 
[ 4] There is no rea:;on why a grain farmer or nursery 
operator who eOllducis his enterprise on separate real prop-
erty should be exempted from the normal apportionment rule 
and not be required to account to the community for a portion 
of the profits . Accordingly, the P epper case has been justly 
criticized. (See 1 Armstrong, California F amily Law 480; 
4 "\Yitkin , Summary of California Law [7th ed.] 2725] ; Con-
tinuing Education of the Bar, Family Law for California 
Lawyers, 368-369; Evans, Primary Sourc es of Acqllisition of 
Community Propel'fy, 10 Cal.L.Rev. 271, 284; ct. 14 Cal.L. 
Rev. 402, 404-405.) 
The Pepper holding was based not only on the erroneous 
concession of counsel, but also on the ground that it is "im-
possible to apportion the crop so as to determine what share 
of it has come from the soil and what share from the exertions 
of man." (158 Cal. at p. 624.) Although it may be difficult 
to make an apportionment, it is "impossible" only in the 
sense that it cannot be mathematically certain. (See J enkl:ns 
v. J enkins, llO Cal.App.2d 663, 666 [243 P.2d 79], where 
5/ 14 of 28 head of cattle bought with the husband's separate 
property were apportioned to the community.) The long 
line of cases starting with Percl:ra dispels any notion that 
such impossibility justifies a finding that none of the proceeds 
belongs to the community. These cases have established the 
rule that when part of the proceeds from a separate property 
enterprise or im'estment arise from the husband's efforts, 
there must be an apportionm ent. E stat e 0/ P epper, Sllpra, 
158 Cal. 619, is therefore overruled. [5] The first proposed 
instrnction was properly rcfu'>ed, for it erroneously declared 
that even though a husband devoted his efforts to farming 
operations all of the income and earnings therefrom would 
be his separate property. 
[6a] The second proposed instruction declared: "Evi-
dence that there was no excess of community income over 
community expenses is as effective to prove that all assets in 
the name of a decedent are separate property as a specific 
showing from which separate source each asset fiowed." The 
proposed instruction is base(l npon a statement in Estate of 
Ades, 81 Cal.App.2cl 334, 339 [18'1 P.2d 1], which was quoted 
with approval in Estate 0/ Arstein, 56 Cal.2d 239, 242 [14 
Cal.Rptr. 809, 364 P.2d 33]. This statement was properly 
invoked in those cases, for transmutation of separate property 
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into community propcrty by agrecment was 1I0t in is.~uc . Au 
instruction bascd on that StatcIllcnt would be enoneou.;ly in-
complete, however, whrll, as ill the prcsent casc, sueh trans· 
mutation is in issue. 
[7] It is presllmed tha t t hc expellSCS of the f ,1mily are 
paid fro111 commu nity rather thau scpar;lt:~ funds. (H 'uber 
v. Hub er, 27 Ca1.2d 784, 792 [167 P.2d 708] .) Thus, in the 
absence of any evidence shO\ving a llifi'er cut practice the com-
munity earnings arc chargeable with these expenses. (Title 
Ins. & Trust Ca. v. Il1 gersoll, 158 Cal. 474, 402 [111 P. 360].) 
[8] When a husband devotcs his scrvices to and invests 
his separate property in an economic enterprise, the part 
of the profits or increment in value attributable to the hus-
band's services must be apportioned to the community. [9] If 
the amount apportioned to the commnnity is less than the 
amount expended for family purposes and if the presumption 
that family expenses are paid from communi ty funds applies, 
all assets traceable to the inve~tmellt arc deemed to be the 
husband's separate property. ( Estate of Adcs, supra, 81 
Cz.l.App.2d at p. 338; Estat c of Arstein, supra. 56 Ca1.2d at 
p. 241; Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal.App.2d 587, 601-602 [250 
P.2d 730] ; Cozzi V. COZZ1', 81 Cal.App.2d 229, 232·233 [183 
P.2d 739].) [10] Similarly, when a husband purchases 
property during the marriage with funds of an undisclosed 
or disputed source, the presumpt ion that the property is com-
munity may be overcome by evidence that community ex· 
penses exceeded the community income. In sucll a case, the 
husband traces the source of the disputed property to his 
separate property by a process of elimination: since all the 
community illC'ome was exhausted b:v family expenses the 
property must have been purchased with his separate funds. 
( Kenn cy v. K enney, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 136 [274 P .2d 951] ; 
Th omasset v. Thoma sset, 122 Cal.App .2d 116, 126-127 [264 
P .2d 626].) 
[6b] In either of these hyo types of cases, the instruction 
proposed by appellants would accurately state the law only if 
the wife did not introduce evidence that the husband's sep-
arate propert.y was transmuted into community property. If 
the jury found that there was such an agreement, an exces~ 
of community expenses over community income could not 
prove that assets in the husband's name were his separate 
property. Thus, within the context of this case, the proposed 
instruction was inaccurate and was properly refused. 11ore-
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over, the jury was correctly informed of the nature and effect 
of the presumption in another instruction1 given to the jury. 
Appellants' basic contention is that there is no substantial 
evidence to support the special verdict. [11] Since neither 
Ines nor any other witness testified that there was a written 
or oral agrcemen t changing the character of her hlL':;band's 
separate property (see Woods Y. Secu.rity-Fil·st Nat. Bank, 
46 Ca1.2J 697, 701 [299 P.2d 657] ; Kenn ey Y. Kenney, 220 
Cal. 134, 136 [30 P.2d 398]), she is compelled to rely upon 
the rule first stated. in Title Insurancc &- Trust CO. Y. Ingersoll, 
153 Cal. 1, 5 [94 P. 94] : "it is not essential in such a case for 
the husband to show any express agreement on the part of the 
wife. The gift or change in the status of the property may 
be shown by the very nature of the transaction or appeal' 
from the surrounding circumstances." (See also Long ...... 
Long, 88 Cal.App.2d 544, 5-±9 [199 P.2d 47] .) 
Although there is suustantial evidence in the record that 
would support a finding of transmetat ion, it is apparent from 
the special verdict that the jury based its verdict not on 
transmutation, but on a faulty understanding of the instruc-
tions relating to commingling of community and separate 
property. 
The jury found the 1,307 and 821-acre parcels and all assets 
traceable to them to be commuuity property. Payments on 
the purchase price of each of these parcels were made before 
and after Charles' marriage to Ines and many improvements 
were made thereon after the marriage. The jury, however, 
found the purchase price due Charles on the 1951 sale of the 
24-acre parcel to be half separate and half community prop-
erty. Although improvements "ere also made on this parcel 
after the marriage, Charles had paid the entire purchase 
price for it before the marriage. Since there is no evidence 
that there "as a transmutation of the first two parcels but not 
of the third, the jury must have interpreted the iustructions 
to mean that land is entirely community if commnnity funds 
are used. to pay a part of the purchase price regardless of 
the fact that snb"t:mtial separate property funds "ere also 
1" It is presumed tha.t nil liying expenses during marriage are paid 
from commurl:ity income. if any exists. If you f.nn. that any of the 
income received from any sourcp. either by Cltnrles Christian Neilson or 
hy Ines Neilson during their marria ge was community property and 
that all living expenses were paid from community Innds, then you must 
subtract from such commnnity income all family liying expenses of the 
Neilson family during the marriage, and only the balance remaining, 
if any, would ha"e the status of community property." 
) 
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used. [12] Such an interpretation is erroneous, for "the 
rule developed through the decisions in California gives to 
the community a pro tanto community property interest in 
such property in the ratio that the payments on the purchase 
price with community funds bear to the payments made with 
separate funds." (Forbes v. Fm'bes, 118 Cal.App.2d 324, 
325 [257 P.2d 721]; Garten v. Garten, 140 Cal.App.2d 489, 
494 [295 P.2d 23] ; Estate of Fellou~s, 106 Cal.App. 681, 683 
[289 P. 887].) In such cases, the property cannot be con-
sidered entirely community by virtue of commingling of 
separate and community assets, for the separate and com-
munity sources of the property can be traced. (Fountain v. 
Maxim, 210 Cal. 48, 51 [290 P. 576] ; Thomassct v. Thomasset, 
122 Cal.App.2d 116,124 [264 P.2d 626].) Upon the evidence 
before it, the jury had no choice but to find that all three 
parcels of land had or had not been transmuted to community 
property, and if not to apportion the property according to 
the extent that separate and community funds contributed to 
the various purchase prices and improvements. 
Because of this inconsistency in the jury's verdict the de-
cree must be reversed. To aid the trial court on the retrial 
of this case, however, we shall consider the evidence that 
Ines contends would support an inference that there was an 
agreement of transmutation and also appellants' contention 
that interest cannot be awarded in an heirship proceeding. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 53.) 
Ines testified that Charles filed joint income tax returns 
each year of their marriage except 1946 when individual re-
turns were filed. The 1946 returns also split the total income 
of both spouses. [13] The fact that a husband and wife 
filed tax returns splitting their income before 19482 is sub-
stantial evidence that will support a finding of transmutation. 
(Heck v. Heck, 63 Cal.App.2d 470, 475 [147 P.2d 110]; 
'Joint returns filed in 1948 and subsequent years are no evidence of 
transmutation. Since that year husbands and wives in all states have 
been permitted to file joint returns and split their income whether the 
income reported is separate or community. (Revenue Act of 1948, ~~ 301, 
303, 6:l Stat. 114, 115, 26 U.S.C.A. ~~ 2, 6013; see also Hofferbert v. 
JIarsllall (4 Cir. 1952) 200 F.2d 648, 650-651.) Before 1948, spouses 
living in community property states could split their community income 
if the wife had a present, existing. and equal interest in the community 
property: (Poe Y. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 111 [51 S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 
~39l; Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 [51 S.Ct. 62, 75 L .Ed. 247]; 
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 [.~1 S.Ct. 62, 75 L.Ed. 249]; BeniJer v. 
Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 ['11 S.Ct. 64, 75 L.Ed. 252]; United State8 V. 
Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 [;;1 S.Ct. 184, 75 L.Ed. 714].) 
) 
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Estate of Ra.phael, 91 Cal.App.2d 931, 939 [206 P.2d 391] ; 
see also Lawateh v. Lawateh, 161 Cal.App.2d 780, 790 [327 
P.2d 603] ; Estate of Cumm·ins, 130 Cal.App.2d 821, 82!J [280 
P.2d 128]; Handley v. Handley, 113 Cal.App.2d 280, 284 
[248 P.2d 59].) The filing of such returns, however, does not 
establish transmutation as a matter of law. (Bal'ker v. Barker, 
139 Cal.App.2d 206, 212-213 [293 P.2d 85]; K enney v. 
H enn ey, 128 Cal.App.2d128, 135 [274 P.2d 951].) 
[14] It is presumed that a person obeys the law. (Code 
Civ. Proe., § 1963, subd. 33; Groves v. City of Los Angeles, 
40 Cal.2d 751, 757 [256 P.2d 309] ; Gould v. StafJord, 91 Cal. 
146, 153 [27 P. 543].) Charles and Ines could split their 
income for tax purposes prior to 1948 only if it was commu-
nity income or each owned half the property. Their returns 
were signed under the penalty of perjury and created a dis-
putable presumption that Charles had filed lawful income 
returns and that his separate property had therefore been 
transmuted into community property. (See Harlow v. United 
Title Guaranty Co ., 145 Cal.App.2d 672, 675 [303 P.2d 16].) 
[ 15 ] This presumption can be overcome by evidence that 
the income splitting represented nothing more than an "over-
zealous desire to minimize income taxes." (See Marsh, Cali-
fornia Family Law-A Review, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 368, 373.) 
Such evidence might consist of testimony that the returns were 
prepared by or upon the advice of a tax expert and the 
spouses did not nnderstand the significance of reporting in-
come in this manner (Hopkins v. Detrick, 97 Cal.App.2d 50, 
56 [217 P.2d 78] ; Balkema v. Deiches, 90 Cal.App.2d 427,430-
431 [202 P.2d 1068]), or of testimony or documents indicating 
that the spouses regarded the property as separate property 
despite the filing of income-splitting returns. 
In three sales of property that Charles owned at the time 
of the marriage, the deeds contained Charles' and Ines' signa-
tures and the granting clauses stated that both were the 
grantors. Two of these deeds were executed in 1955, the other 
in 1956. The granting clauses of at least four other deeds 
executed between 1946 and 1956, however, described Charler; 
as "dealing with his sole and separate property," and as the 
grantor. Moreover, an officer of the title insurance company, 
upon whose forms the deeds containing Ines' name and signa-
ture were executed, testified that it was the policy of his 
company and the lending institution that financed the trans-
actions to require a wife to join in the execution of a deed 
even when title to the property is vested in her husband. He 
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testified [urthet' that the policy of his company did not pur-
port to reflect the charade .. : of the property being' conveyed. 
Ines also exet:uted five joiJlt alld several notes with her 
husband. All of these llote~ w"re exe(:uted wi thin a fiVe- iEOJlth 
period in 1956. The officer of the bank ,,,ho negotiated tl lCse 
loaus testified that he had Ines sigu tile uotes because" in 1 UiJ6 
I noticed that Mr. Nielson's health was failing and so I figured 
the bauk ,,"ould be in a better positiou to haye both parties on 
thc Note in ca~e something' ~hould happen to Mr. Nielson." 
'1'his testimony also explains the addition of Ines' name to 
Charles' open-note accollnt with the bank in 1956. 
[16] Under these circ;ul1ls tauces, the fact that Ines jOil; ',U 
in the execution of three deeds and five 11otes, taken alone, 
would not be sufficient to sustain a finding' of transmutation. 
(See Wedem ryer v. Elm er, 33 Cal.App.2c1 336, 3:39 [91 P.2d 
642] ; Madin v. Martin, iJ2 Cal. 235, 237; Oldci'sllaw v. Matte -
son ((; WmiamsoH Jijg. Cu., 19 Cal.App. 179, 183 [125 P. 263] ; 
Diefe ndorf] v. Hopkins, 95 Cal. 343, 351 [28 P. 365, 30 P. 
549] ; Kenney v. Kenn ey, 128 Cal.App.2d 128, 138 [274 P.2d 
9.51].) The jury could, however, consider these documents 
as evidence supporting the presumption that by filing the 
income-splitting tax returns Charles had converted his sepa-
rate property into community property. 
Ines testified that when she signed the first joint note the 
bank officer said in substance "that it was our property, and 
- our community property, and he ,,"ould like my signature, 
with my husband's on the note." She also t estified that 
Charles was present at the time and said nothing to the 
contrary. The bank officer testified that he could not remem-
ber making such a statement and that he requested Ines' sig-
nature on the note because of Charles' fuiling' health. 
[17] When a person makes a statement in the presence 
of a party to an action under circumstances that "ould 
normally call for a response if the statemcnt " ere untrue, the 
statement io;; admissible for t he limited pmpose of sho\'\ing the 
party's reaction to it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 3; 
A .. dkills v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 255 [193 P. 251] ; People v. 
SimlJ!ons, 28 Ca1.2d 699, 71:2-713 [172 P.2J 18].) His silence, 
eyasion, or equiyocation may be cO;ls; llerec1 ail a tacit adm ission 
of the statements made in his pre:;ence. (Es tate of S1101;;ball, 
1.57 Cal. 301, 311 [107 P . 598] ; Iibbct v. Sue, 125 Cal. 544, 
546 [58 P. 160].) [18] Althong'~l Charles was not a party 
to this act!o!!, any o.clrnissiolls he rna:\' have made with regard 
to the character of the prolwri:v \ .... on1 (1 be binding upon appel-. 
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lants as his succ:e3sors in interest. (Code Ciy. Proc., § 1870, 
subd. 4; E state of lIill, 167 C~d. 50, 6:; [138 P. 600] ; Inucrsoll 
v. Tnl cbody, 40 Cal. 603, 613.) [19] Admissibility of this evi-
dence depends upon whether the bauk officer made the al-
lcged statcment under cir cumstances that called for a reply, 
whether Charles understood the statement, and 'rhethcr it could 
lje inferred irom his conduct that he adopted thc statrp,ent as 
an admissioll . (People Y. Pnrvl:s, 36 Ca1.2cl03, 97 [13 C:!l .Rptr. 
801, 362 P.2d 713] ; People v. S:mmons, supra; Southers v. 
Savage, 191 Cal.App.2d 100, 104-103 [12 Cal.Rptr. 470.) The 
bank officer did not make the alleged statement under circum-
stances that would ordinarily evoke a response. This is not a 
case where a person was silent iu the facc of an accusation of a 
crime, negligence, or other wl·ongdoing. (See Keller v. Key 
System Tl'allsit L ines, 120 Cal.App.2d 593, 596 [277 P.2d 
860].) The alleged remark, mal~e privately to Charles and 
Ines by a person ,,-110 apparently had no particular familiarity 
with the character of their property, was at most a vague and 
incollclusive assertion that some unidentified items "'ere COIll -
J",lUnity property. (Compare the explicit statement made in 
the husband's presence by his attorney in Lalcatch v. Lalcatch , 
IGI Cal.App.2d 780, 790 [327 P.2cl 603].) Under these cir-
cumstances, Charles' silence cannot be interpreted as an adop-
tiyc admission. (Perkins v. West, 122 Cal.App.2d 585, 391 
[ ~6;) P.2d 538] ; Henderson v. Nodhlzal1l, 176 Cal. 493, 497 
l lGB P. 1044] ; Wilkins v. StidOC1', 22 Cal. 231, 230 [83 ~\.lll. 
Dec. 64].) 
lYe agree ,,"ith appellants that the trial court errl' d in 
awarding interest to 111es. [20] Probate Code section 1233 
proyides : "Except as otherwise provided by this code or by 
rules adopted by the Judicial Council, the provisions of Part 2 
of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to and consti-
tute the rnles of practice in the proceedings mentioned in 
this code with r egard to b'ids. new trials, appeals, and all 
other matters of procedure." Thus, Code of Civil Procedure 
section 58], providing ",-hen an action may be dismissed 
(O'Day Y. Supuior COllrt, 18 Ca1.2d 540, 542-543 [116 P .2d 
621] ), section 583, pro-..-ic1ing for dismissal for want of prose-
cution (Est'1f~ of J10]';'is01l, 125 Cal.App. 504, 509 [14 P .2(1 
102] ), and Settioll 387, providin~ for intervention by inter-
ested persons ( YIJ ~fC C Y. Superior COllrt, 20 Ca1.2d 479, 485 
[127 P.2d 536] ) Ul)ply to proceec1ings in probate. Not all of 
the proyisiollS of part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply 
to probatc proceedillgs, hon-ever. Such proceedings are to 
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conform only "as nearly as is consistently posStDle, to those 
for civil actions." (0 'Day v. Superior Cmirt, supra, 18 Cal.2d 
at p. 543.) (Italics added.) (See also Horney v. Superior 
C01irt, 83 Cal.App.2d 262, 267 [188 P.2d 552]. ) 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 provides in part that 
"[t]he clerk or judge must include in the judgment entered 
up by him, any interest on the verdict or decision of the court, 
from the time it was rendered or made, and the costs, if the 
same have been taxed or ascertained." Ines contends that this 
section is incorporated into the Probate Code through section 
1233 of that code and applies to heirship decrees. [21] Pro-
bate Code section 1232, however, authorizes an award of costs 
in heirship proceedings, but neither that nor any other section 
of the Probate Code specifically authorizes an interest award 
in such proceedings. The fact that provision is made for costs 
but not for interest indicates that interest is not to be 
awarded. Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 is 
included in part 2, title 14, chapter 6, which deals almost 
exclusively with the awarding of costs in civil actions. Had 
the Legislature meant to authorize interest awards in heirship 
proceedings it would have specifically so provided in the 
Probate Code as it did for costs or would have made no provi-
sion for costs in that code. [22] Furthermore, an heirship 
proceeding is not an ordinary civil action, but a specialized 
proceeding in rem. (Estate of Wise, 34 Cal.2d 376, 383 [210 
P.2d 497].) [2 3 ] The sole purpose of such a proceeding is 
to "determine who are the heirs of the decedent or entitled to 
distribution of the estate and [to] ... specify their in-
terests." (Prob. Code, § 1081.) [24] The decree is not 
in favor of one of the parties against another. (Estate of 
Wise, supra, 34 Ca1.2d at p . 385; Estate of Radovich, 48 Cal.2d 
116, 120 [308 P.2d 14] .) [25] As was stated in Whalen 
v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 364 [124 P . 904, Ann. Cas. 1913E 
1319]: "This section [predecessor of Prob. Code, §§ 1080-
1082] provides a special proceeding for the purpose of ascer-
taining and determining, in advance of distribution, the per-
sons who have succeeded to the estate and the portions in-
herited by or devised to each of them .. . . No other judgment 
is to be rendered and no disposition whatever is to be made 
of the e'ttate. It is a determination, first, of the persons 
entitled as heirs, devisees, or legatees, or as their successors, 
if any have died; and, second. the interest of each one in 
the estate of the decedent." [26] In view of the limited 
purpose of an heirship proceeding and the fact that interest 
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is ordiuarily awarued only on a money judgment (Sullivan 
v. Wellborn, 32 Ca1.2d 214, 219 [195 P.2d 787]) the court 
erroneously awarded Ines interest on half the property found 
to be community property. 
The decree is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 20, 
1962. 
